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Adolescence versus Politics:
Metaphors in Late Colonial Uganda

Carol Summers

In 1943, Bishop Cyril Stuart, head of the Native Anglican Church of Uganda,
tried to explain his own unpopularity and make sense of Uganda’s ongoing
political crises by asserting that the country was full of “lovable people” who
were in a “very difficult adolescent stage.”1The bishop was describing a spe
cific challenging political context in Uganda. The frame of adolescence that
he used, though, was much larger. This was not a casual reference; the bishop
was drawing on a vision of empire and change rooted in the social sciences
rather than in the older metaphors that undergirded systems of indirect rule
and deployed languages of racial difference or portrayed a parental Britain
saving its vulneraole child-subjects. This social-science metaphor of promis
ing but difficult adolescence, and its associated ideas of tumultuous matura
tion and stages of growth, allowed British colonial actors to think about
politics and change in psychosocial terms. These replaced both older essentialist categories and newer Marxist economic analyses of exploitation and
class struggle with an overtly apolitical idea of organic (if disruptive and loud)
political change. Within this new frame, progressive imperialists argued for
an ongoing and even intensified engagement with the protesting people of the
empire, an engagement that became known as a second colonial occupation.
Protests were heard not as descriptive statements of literal misrule or abuse,
but as signs of adolescent maturation, a stage that would pass and would
1 Bishop Cyril Stuart to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30-10-43 CMS G3 A7 d l,
Church Missionary Society Archives, Birmingham University, Birmingham, UK.
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eventually yield a newly adult people, grateful for their parents’ care. Thus
protests were understood as auspicious signals of Britain’s successful nurture
of a maturing people, rather than as dire markers of the people’s poverty and
the British empire’s failures.
This British deployment of metaphors of adolescence differed mark
edly from the French rhetoric of the era, which recognized the adulthood
of the colonized and the possibility of adult citizenship, even when arguing
over biological children of mixed ancestry.2 Even during the Vichy years,
when assimilationist ideas were eclipsed, French administrators did not
portray Africans as less than adults.3 Beyond Vichy, the African labor activ
ists and soldiers that Frederick Cooper and Gregory Mann have discussed,
and the anticolonial migrants Michael Goebel has described in Paris’s
streets, salons, and coffee shops, were seen as adults and included citizens
and savvy negotiators such as Lamine Gueye and Leopold Senghor.4
The British Empire of the mid-twentieth century, however, struggled
with its own rhetoric and ideals. Asian moves toward self-rule and increas
ing levels of autonomy from the dominions diminished Britain’s status at a
time when austerity and reconstruction at home limited its economic ability
to assert global power. Racist and paternalistic ideas of empire were being
explicitly challenged by the Atlantic Charter and new rhetorics of human
rights.5 Tensions between the US and the Soviet Union offered an opportu
nity to view the world in Cold War terms, but rhetoric about the dangers
of communism in Africa mostly fell flat. Uganda’s conservative governor
Sir John Hall, increasingly nervous about the security situation during the
late 1940s, at times tried to discredit activists by labeling them communists,
only to be mocked by Semakula Mulumba, his loudest critic, who declared,
“There are no Communists in Uganda. We are not Communists. The
Uganda people do not know the meaning of Communism. They do, how
ever, know that the Governor, who is not a ‘Communist,’ treats them
2 See, for example, Emmanueile Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizen
ship in the French Colonies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 2012).
3 Eric T. Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Petain’s National Revolution in Madagascar,
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001),
20-78.
4 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and
French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Gregory Mann,
Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2006); and Michael Goebel, The Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar
Paris and the Seeds o f Third World Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
5 Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1979 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2009), 101-14.
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badly.”* With visions of class struggle and revolutionary war against
exploitation and oppression, popular ideas of communism risked ex
acerbating Ugandan tensions in ways neither British administrators nor
Ugandan activists found appealing.
In the 1940s and into the 1950s, British administrators and intellectual
and religious leaders within Uganda, an economically dynamic but politi
cally challenging protectorate, found the metaphor of adolescence both fit
ting and very useful. This vocabulary drew on and contributed to a global,
cosmopolitan social-science literature of psychology and social maturation.
British leaders in Uganda made that vocabulary local through the hap
hazard initiatives of the bishop and more systematic work by the social
scientists of the East African Institute for Social Research. Within this
framework, they built local analyses that allowed them to reject the politi
cal critiques and clashing claims of local political debates. The metaphor of
adolescence worked against politics based in individual citizenship, rights,
or class struggle, and instead reframed tensions as a blameless and tempo
rary family drama.
Beyond Uganda, sociology and psychology, rather than older forms of
observational cultural anthropology, had become increasingly prominent
parts of colonial discourse during and after World War II. George Steinmetz, for example, has emphasized that the period from the 1940s through
the 1960s was formative for British sociology, which eclipsed anthropology
in the late colonial world. Sociologists sought explicitly to analyze social
structures as well as the challenges of modernization that were larger and
messier than anthropological analyses. Anthropological analyses remained
smaller in scale, tied to culture, ethnicities, and governing principles of indi
rect rule.67 Understanding colonial minds was also a central aim of the era’s
new psychological investigations, according to Erik Linstrum. With new
tools such as color wheels and tachitoscopes, psychological researchers
experimented to test how people perceived, thought, and reacted in cultures
such as those of the Torres Straits, far removed from Britain. Such invest
igations often found ranges of variation among colonial subjects that
paralleled findings from Britain, supporting broader normative ideas of
humanity against older racial categories. Laboratory findings contributed
to practical innovations in military assignments and eventually even in
6 Semakula Mulumba, “Commentary on the Replies of the Colonial Secretary,” Novem
ber 24, 1950, CO 537/581, British National Archives, Kew, London.
7 George Steinmetz, “A Child of the Empire: British Sociology and Colonialism, 1940s1960s,” Journal o f the History o f the Behavioral Sciences 49, no. 4 (2013): 353-78.
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counterinsurgency and community development, where group therapy
ideals provided the basis for attempts at remaking colonial authority to
“minimize transference” and downplay hierarchy.8
The context of modernizing social sciences that shaped a new sociology
and psychology brought forward not just the investigative methods and
disciplinary infrastructure Linstrum and Steinmetz have described, but new
concepts as well. Significantly, during the early twentieth century social sci
entists built the category of adolescence, working to understand changing
social realities in the United States, Britain, and beyond through a concept
advocates assumed would have a broader relevance. Sociologist G. Stanley
Hall’s Adolescence, published in 1904, depicted a new, modern stage of life
that had physiological and psychological, anthropological and sociological
implications. Adolescence was, in this early discussion, both something
everyone experienced and a topic that required attention to ethnic differen
tiation. Even in his pioneering work, Hall made clear that the concept went
beyond the individual: he referred as well to “adolescent races,” discussing
their needs for teaching and treatment.9 In subsequent years, publications
on adolescence proliferated, positioning the concept as central to analyses
not simply by academic sociologists, but by professionals ranging from
school teachers to psychologists and beyond. The concept Hall built was
not simply a biological or psychological given. He emphasized how a new
modernity had reshaped experiences of maturation. By the 1940s, colonial
leaders used the concept as a metaphor to dismiss African politicians as
disruptive adolescents, going beyond Hall’s emphasis on adolescence as a
stage of individuals’ lives occasioned by social modernity.10 “Adolescence”
became a way to explain how people and societies collectively experienced
social and political change.
Metaphorical narratives have offered historical actors means to make
sense of their contexts; they have also structured, and at times overwritten,
alternative interpretations of complex events.*11 The individuals who de
ployed the idea of adolescence went beyond a description of biological mat
uration or generational transition to draw on the metaphor’s vision of
8 Erik Linstrum, Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2016), esp. 13-42, 155-65.
9 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthro
pology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1904).
10 Sir Philip Mitchell, cited in Linstrum, Ruling Minds, 171.
11 See, for example, Severine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the
Congo and their Unintended Consequences,” African Affairs (2012): 202-22.
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tumultuous psychological maturation. They treated adolescence and youth
as a key aspect of political clashes and of hopes for the future. 12 This article
thus discusses adults who talked about adolescence rather than focusing on
either real children or policymaking for children. 13
Uganda’s own African politicians used more complicated metaphors
of childhood, maturation, generational rights, and parental inefficiency,
rejecting the simplified dismissal of their grievances implicit in the concept
of adolescence. Within Uganda, African politics included occasional pro
tests by youth and by ambitious junior men excluded from Buganda’s oli
garchic officeholding leadership. Some of these activists aligned themselves
with their grandfathers to call for the stewardship of Buganda’s resources,
while others drew on older Ganda ideas of generational transition tied to
the king’s life cycle to emphasize the need to challenge and remake the
kingdom of Buganda at a time when a young king was beginning to rule. 14
Uganda’s activists of all ages invoked youth occasionally, but emphasized
inheritance and citizenship. They critiqued greedy leaders and inadequate
British patronage. They did not consider their concerns to be childish or
adolescent.
It was British observers who invoked the metaphor of adolescence.
They drew on it, investigated it specifically through research in Uganda,
and deployed it to explain clashes over development, imperial power, and
local opportunities. The metaphor’s psychosocial imagery defended Brit
ain’s role and deflected blame or accountability. The presence and persis
tence of ideas of adolescence in Uganda offer a guide to the mental world
of late colonial power. A focus on that metaphor allows us to see beyond
the messy, complicated event history of the era to the ways that the era’s
religious leaders, social scientists, and administrators used this key concept
both to understand and to explain away the troubling political implications
of the period’s clashes.
12 Carol Summers, “Young Buganda and Old Boys: Youth, Generational Transition, and
Ideas of Leadership in Buganda, 1920-1949,” Africa Today 3 (2005): 109-28.
13 See, for example, Beverly Grier, Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial
Zimbabwe (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2006), and Abosede A. George, Making
Modern Girls: A History o f Girlhood, Labor, and Social Development in Colonial Lagos
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), as well as Ellen Boucher, Empire’s Children: Child
Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline o f the British World, 1869-1967 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), and David M. Pomfret, Youth and Empire: TransColonial Childhoods in British and Trench Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press
2015).
14 Summers, “Youth, Elders and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial
Buganda,” in Generations Past: Youth in East African History, ed. Andrew Burton and
Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 175-95.
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UGANDANS AS ADO LESCENTS
By the end of World War II, Uganda’s administration, its missionaries, and
the colonial office back in London had mostly gotten over any ideas they
might have had that Ugandans were simply innocent children who could be
protected and guided to maturity by a paternal British Empire. The protec
torate was, after all, centered in Buganda, a kingdom run by a canny elite
that had aggressively negotiated for power in Buganda and over Uganda
even as they accepted formal loyalty to the Queen of England. Even the
losers in that 1900 negotiation process had gone on to engage in vigorous
and ultimately successful negotiations that led to the reclamation of Bataka
(clan) lands and a cautious attitude by British administrators that persisted
throughout the colonial years.15 Political mobilization by the Sons of Kintu,
the M otor Drivers’ Association, the Bataka Union, the Cotton Growers’
Association, and other groups from the 1930s through the 1950s, as well
as the growth of a vigorous and critical Luganda press, forced administra
tors and British experts to acknowledge the variety and complexity of
Uganda’s political scene, which they documented copiously in intelligence
reports and sought to interpret with cutting-edge expertise from interna
tional social scientists.16
Increasing political mobilization and effective Ganda leadership during
and after the war challenged British imperial authority. British observers
struggled to explain chaotic and high-profile school strikes in 1941, espe
cially at the country’s elite school, King’s College Budo.17 They witnessed a
general strike in 1945 that immobilized Kampala and attacked “progres
sive” gentlemen such as Buganda’s treasurer, Serwano Kulubya. They read
complaints about British administration in local papers and in pamphlets
15 Holly Hanson, Landed Obligation: The Practice o f Power in Buganda (Portsmouth,
N.H.: Heinemann, 2004).
16 On early political successes, see Hanson, Landed Obligation. On late colonial political
associations, see Summers, “Radical Rudeness: Ugandan Social Critiques during the
1940s,” Journal o f Social History 39, no. 3 (2006): 741-70; Summers, “Grandfathers,
Grandsons, Morality, and Radical Politics in Late Colonial Buganda,” International Jour
nal o f African Historical Studies 38, no. 3 (2005): 427-47; and Summers, “Catholic
Action and Ugandan Radicalism: Political Activism in Buganda, 1930-1950,” Journal o f
Religion in Africa 39, no. 1 (2009): 60-90. For official discussion, see CO 537/4342,
British National Archives, Kew, London. On the East African Social Institute for Social
Research at Makerere University, see D. A. Low, “Uganda: Makerere and Sir Andrew
Cohen in the 1950s,” [1984?] undated typescript, MSS Afr s 1825, Rhodes House
Library, Oxford University.
17 Summers, “ ‘Subterranean Evil’ and ‘Tumultuous Riot’ in Buganda: Authority and
Alienation at King’s College, Budo, 1942,” Journal o f African History 47 (2006): 9 3 113.
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and books, ranging from the Luganda Buganda nyaffe (Buganda our
mother) to the English-language An African Soldier Speaks. And they
examined the widespread destruction caused by the 1949 uprising in a
regional context, comparing it to the greater violence of Kenya’s “Mau
Mau mobilization and acknowledging that Uganda’s politics could get
worse. Alarmed, they used courts, collective fines, deportations, and new
propaganda techniques to seek to control an increasingly restive public.
Most notably, they struggled with a young but increasingly defiant kabaka
of Buganda, Mutesa II, who began to associate himself with the political
activists of the kingdom rather than with his British foster parents after
emerging from the regency of senior advisors. Deporting him at the end of
1953 failed to calm Buganda’s politics, though, and instead offered a wide
range of political figures an opportunity to come together in an ultimately
successful campaign to force both local British protectorate officials and
high-level bureaucrats and politicians in London to back down, seek help,
and literally, somewhat desperately, rewrite the terms of Buganda’s rela
tionship with Uganda in a new constitution before returning the muchstrengthened king to Uganda.18
In such a chaotic context, the metaphor of Uganda’s adolescence
proved helpful to British administrators and activists, particularly progres
sive ones associated with liberalism and progressive Christianity (such as
Bishop C. Stuart) and leftist politicians and professional activists (such as
leftist M. P. Fenner Brockway and cooperatives expert Diane Noakes).
Rebellion, chaos, ungratefulness, and demands to be left alone, in this met
aphor, became no more than what would be expected of such a stage of
maturity. Instead of needing to reconsider the persistence of British domina
tion of church or government, or to blame themselves for provoking rebel
lion tnrough lack of resources, abusive policies, or active misrule, liberal
and Labour interpreters could thus transform scathingly abusive local polit
ical rhetoric into something tolerable and perhaps expected of rebellious
youth. Eventually, the metaphor of adolescence implied, Buganda’s leaders
might stop referring to well-meaning Britons as white swine, bloodsuckers,
and robbers—all terms notable in activists’ condemnations of British
policy.19
Even in the short term, ideas of adolescence, with their psychological
emphasis on stages of growth rather than exploitation, abuse, or other
18 Summers, “Youth, Elders and Metaphors.”
19 Dauci Musoke Mukibiira and Semakuia Mulumba, for example, in Low, ed., The Mind
o f Buganda: Documents o f the M odem History o f an African Kingdom (Berkeley: Uni
versity of California Press, 1971). See also Summers, “Radical Rudeness.”
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explanations for ungrateful and restive local political statements, offered
the British a way of explaining why they sought to increase British invest
ment and attention in a context where an articulate local political class
was increasingly suspicious and resistant. British political and economic
development policy in Uganda during the 1940s and 1950s was not a
response to public demand. Economically successful already, Buganda’s
core political activists of that era put their money and resources against an
experimental cotton station, a campaign for land conservation through the
cultivation of elephant grass, and the administration’s efforts to intervene
in ginning and the cotton market. They actively resisted “Closer Union” for
a larger political and economic development zone that would have united
Uganda and Kenya, and opposed electing representatives of Buganda to the
Uganda Protectorate’s Legislative Assembly. Even the land bill that permit
ted the transformation of Makerere into a University College had been
forced through Buganda’s Lukiiko (parliament) against public opinion,
triggering the assassination of the prime minister, who had advocated for
the university. In his visit to Buganda, Fenner Brockway found himself
shocked both by local activists’ ability to organize and by their blunt rejec
tion of the sorts of market interventions and government planning that Brit
ain’s farmers had long accepted as progressive and constructive.20
Given such broad political opposition, British policy in the postwar
years was thus bluntly anti-political even as it touted economic and political
development and progress. But when facing effective opposition to initia
tives rooted in expertise, development, and progress, intellectuals resorted
to justifying their initiatives through a patronizing psychosocial language
of adolescent rebellion and growth.

THE WORK OF A METAPHOR:
EVADING BLAME AND JUSTIFYING
INTENSIFIED INTERVENTION
Anti-political politics appears, on the surface, to be an inherently contradic
tory concept. Contradiction, though, is often important to ideological justi
fications: the classic “war to end all wars” concept, along with today’s
“peacekeeping” armies, illustrates this reality. More significant than its
20 Summers, “Local Critiques of Global Development: Patriotism and Power in Late
Colonial Buganda,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 47, no. 1 (2014):
21-35.
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internal contradictions was the congruence that specific aspects of the ado
lescence metaphor offered to the resources, self-image, and ultimate goals
of progressive imperial planners. This was important in an international
atmosphere of nationalism, decolonization, development, and indepen
dence. Older racial ideas of British superiority had faltered, looking suspi
ciously akin to the racism espoused by the Nazis, a toxic resemblance only
strengthened by the rise of white settlers’ racial initiatives in South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya. Britain and the war-stressed British Empire
no longer claimed economic and military superpower status in the increas
ingly bipolar world of the Cold War. Unable to simply claim racial or civilizational superiority, act as an all-powerful protector, or offer copious
patronage, but needing its empire more than ever, Britain needed new ways
to think about its imperial subjects—especially its restive and protesting
subjects.21 Beginning in the 1940s and extending through the last years of
the 1950s, the “second imperial occupation” of territories as diverse as
settler Kenya and the Uganda Protectorate was principally justified by Brit
ish participants and observers by Britain’s ability to bring development.
Development—characterized as a technical, apolitical benefit—allowed
Britain’s liberal, progressive, and socialist imperial activists to justify con
tinued British rule, regardless of popular, and possibly democratic, agita
tion against governors’ and administrators’ interventions. It allowed
planners to substitute expertise for popularity or democracy.22
The problem for British planners, then, was to decide what sort of
development was appropriate. The Russian Stalinist model of rapid indus
trialization complete with centralized planning, ambitious quotas, and a
willingness to sacrifice citizens to the nation was still, in the 1950s, viewed
as a triumph by many even in Britain, and emulated by an ambitious Peo
ple’s Republic of China in the Great Leap Forward. Such plans, though,
required an explicit willingness to sacrifice and struggle. Sacrifice and
struggle—mobilizing bakopi (ordinary people) against “kulaks,” poor
peasants against rich peasants, and everyone against capitalists—did not
fit easily into the British Empire. In the metropole, Fabian and academic
socialism, with an emphasis on reformism and inquiry—technical, profes
sional change rather than populism or revolution through violence—
offered an alternative. Even politicians labeled as “radical” in the British
21 Summers, “Ugandan Politics after World War II,” Africa and World War II, ed. Judith
A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 480-98.
22 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “D evelopm entD epoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
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context, such as Fenner Brockway, tended to emphasize cooperatives, trade
unions, and familiar forms of political and economic action, rather than
overt revolution.23
By the 1940s, in places such as Uganda, Britain had accepted that older
ideas of indirect rule were inadequate and failed to fit local political reali
ties. Ethnicity, chiefship, and “customary” legal systems remained occa
sionally useful, as in Buganda when the cases of thousands of people
arrested during the 1949 uprisings were tried by Buganda courts with
adapted standards of evidence and testimony, rather than clogging protec
torate courts into immobility. Increasingly aware protesters and critics
objected to such uses of “tradition,” however. For the colonial thinkers of
the 1940s and 1950s, there could be no dual mandate to preserve indige
nous traditions and institutions while instructing in the ways of an ideal
civilization.24
Unable to fall back on simple racism or ideas of indirect rule, British
policymakers and politicians actively evaded being cast as the center of cap
ital and exploitation by seeking to reinterpret and reshape conflicts. In
Uganda, this meant that on occasion major socially and economically
important conflicts were officially characterized as personality conflicts.
The most notable of these was the 1945 general strike, which, as Gardner
Thompson has noted, was summarized in an astonishingly incompetent
investigative report that rejected any discussion of economics in favor of an
interpretation based on personal rivalries and, according to a key East Afri
can Institute for Social Research investigator, schoolboy politics.25 As
unrest became even more widespread and complex, such dismissal of griev
ances and politics became more difficult, but nevertheless persisted as offi
cials described notable activists as elderly (in the case of clan heads such as
Jemusi Miti), corrupt and ambitious (such as Ignatius Musazi and Semakula Mulumba) or immature and reckless (such as Abu Mayanja).26
23 See the Papers of the Movement for Colonial Freedom, SOAS special collections, Uni
versity of London; and especially Diane Noakes to Fenner Brockway, 24-7-51, PP MS 56/
8, Diane Noakes papers, SOAS special collections; DO 35/4368 and extensive materials
in CO 822, British National Archives, Kew, London.
24 See Frederick, Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh:
William Blackwell and Sons, 1922). For Ugandan critique, see Sir Phillip Mitchell, in
Low, Mind o f Buganda, 111-17.
25 Gardner Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945,” Afri
can Affairs 91, no. 365 (1992): 605—24; E. M. K. Mulira, “The Legacy of Two Schools:
Being a Historical Background to the Causes of Trouble in Uganda, in 1945,” [undated
typescript, probably early 1945] EMKM KCB 1/1, Mulira Papers, African Studies Center,
Cambridge University.
26 For example, files on Abu Mayanja FCO 141/18246 and J. W. Kiwanuka FCO 141/
18248, National Archives.
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British administrators thus sent or encouraged experts in trade union
ism to go to imperial hinterlands to teach appropriate forms of worker
struggle, making clear that political analysis, strategy, and action could not
be left to local activists, however successful; those activists had in fact won
war bonuses in the 1945 strike, successfully challenged Indians’ monopolies
on cotton ginning in 1949 and retrieved their king through a sophisticated
and complex protest and publicity campaign after the 1953 Kabaka Crisis.
The tactical successes of local Ugandan forms of protest and politics unset
tled British observers and even their allies in the kingdom of Buganda, pro
voking reinterpretation and intervention.
By describing Africans as adolescents, British observers acknowledged
the obvious. Ugandans were not children. They were awake, aware, vocal,
and blaming British administration for a range of problems. Within the
metaphor of adolescence, though, such rebelliousness could be seen as
without cause—as a stage in the protestors’ maturation rather than being
provoked by British malpractice. Adolescent protesters had not been forced
into rebellion by capital or imperial exploitation; rather, they rebelled and
engaged in risky behavior simply as ways of trying to decide who they were.
And it was up to the aging empire not to be hurt or to resort to discipline,
but to channel that rebellion into psychological and social maturation
through guided forms of political development. At times, this meant helping
those that insulted the parental power. At times, it meant setting firm
boundaries. Overall, it meant channeling more resources to gradually
maturing people and institutions, whether those be universities, develop
ment projects, or legislative seats that were key to what has been referred
to as the second colonial occupation.27

O R G A N IC G R O W T H RA TH ER T H A N
CULTURAL AND CLASS WARLARE
The East African Institute for Social Research (EAISR), under Audrey Rich
ards, was at the center of much of this reimagination of Uganda and
Buganda. Seeing an African city and country as a center of adolescent matu
ration was not an obvious metaphor for social scientists. Anthropologists
elsewhere in the world had, after all, emphasized a timeless world of culture
27 For Kenya, see Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 19251952 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
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and “tradition.”28 Even in the context of Northern Rhodesia’s industrializ
ing copper belt, Richards’s earlier ethnography portrayed local people
as part of a poor but integrated cultural system that persisted with little
inclination toward dramatic transformation.29 Audrey Richards came to
Uganda in 1944 after building on an impressive career at the RhodesLivingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia. She was immediately impressed
both by Uganda’s relative affluence and ease, compared not simply to
Northern Rhodesia but to wartime Britain. Her initial program threw her
into contact with Buganda’s remarkably developed indigenous social sec
tor, as she visited with nurses, discussed theology (presumably in English)
with schoolchildren, and realized that she lacked enough dresses to keep up
appearances.30 Under her guidance and that of her successor, Lloyd Fallers,
EAISR sponsored research that led to dissertations and seminar papers, and
to the institute’s most important early publication, The King’s Men: Lead
ership and Status in Buganda on the Eve o f Independence, an edited volume
with essays from several key researchers.31 Published in 1964, after Ugan
da’s independence, it contained research begun and carried out between
1953 and 1958, funded by the Carnegie Foundation and the Colonial
Social Science Research Fund. Initially framed as a collaborative and poten
tially comparative study of leadership, it saw so much complexity in
Buganda as to offer “too many variables” for systematic comparisons, and
thus became an exploration of the kingdom’s society and politics during a
time of political tension, struggle, and transformation. The published ver
sion offered an anthropological vision of Buganda, but the research and
conferences that led to it included work by historians such as D. A. Low
and Kenneth Ingham, political scientists such as Cranford Pratt and David
28 See, for discussion, Peter Mandler, Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won
the Second World War and Lost the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
19 See Audrey I. Richards, Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: An Economic
Study o f the Bemba Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); in contrast to Hortense Powdermaker, Copper Town: Changing Africa (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), or the earlier Uganda-centered work of Lucy Mair, An African People in the Twen
tieth Century (New York: Russell and Russell, 1934).
30 On Richards, see Megan Vaughan and Henrietta Moore, Cutting D own Trees: Gender,
Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province o f Zambia, 1890-1990
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1994), and Lyn Schumaker, Africanizing Anthropology:
Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making o f Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa (Dur
ham: Duke University Press, 2001). On Ugandan conditions, see Richards to “Dearie,” 6
August 1944, Richards papers 18/4, London School of Economics special collections,
London.
31 L. A. Fallers, ed., The King’s Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve o f
Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
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Apter, religion experts F. Welbourn and John Taylor, and, significantly, psy
chologists Mary Ainsworth and Leonard Ainsworth.
L. A. Fallers’s introduction made clear that this study departed signifi
cantly from conventional analyses that might focus on colonial interven
tions and African traditions. Instead he noted quite accurately that
Buganda’s leaders had consistently taken on aspects of modernity for them
selves, rather than seeing them as alien. Continuities—a sort of organic
growth—rather than a colonial or modern rupture defined Buganda’s social
and political experiences. 32 Researchers from Audrey Richards to her junior
colleagues then proceeded to explore what it meant for a people to, in the
eyes of political anthropologists and psychologists, grow up. Working with
Ganda researchers such as S. B. K. Musoke, F. K. Kamoka, and many oth
ers, Fallers described Buganda as a dynamic society, with social mobility
rather than just inherited status and with occupational diversity and com
plex institutions. The expansion of these into, for example, a Uganda Pro
tectorate Department of Hydrological Services, was thus less a dramatic
transformation than a maturation. As for the social and physical mobility
sometimes seen as marking modernity, he noted that in Buganda “mobility
on a very substantial scale is nothing new . ” 33
Mobility, though, especially the sort that led to high status, could be
difficult to achieve. Audrey Richards’s essay, which drew not simply on life
histories and memories but on surveys and interviews with young people,
described how parents sent their children away at some point between the
ages of three and seven so that the children would receive a stricter upbring
ing than parents might provide, and so that those children might acquire
useful connections, or indeed be useful connections, between the parents
who sent them and the sponsors who took them in. Older children, if prom
ising, were sent into even more challenging environments as pages, servants,
concubines, or wives for chiefs, ministers, or even the king. These positions
could involve dramatic danger and punishment. But they also offered real
opportunities for achievement, and thus the child or adolescent was obliged
to accept punishment gratefully. Unsurprisingly, given such expectations,
“hatred and jealousy of the father is recognized in Ganda institutions” since
“a man can only achieve . . . authority by ousting his father . . , ” 34 Politi
cally, Richards argued, this meant that young pages and servants had to
32 Fallers, “Introduction,” King’s Men, 9.
33 Fallers with S. B. K. Musoke, “Social Mobility, Traditional and Modern,” King’s Men,
159.
34 Richards, “Authority Patterns in Traditional Buganda,” in Fallers, King’s Men,
260-66.
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show extreme deference—“creeping along the verandah of the lord’s house
. . . [he] kneels to greet his superior and agrees with whatever the latter may
say” as well as offering “flattery” and “obsequious praise.” Otherwise, the
youth would be seen as seeking to supplant his or her senior.35
Richards sketched these patterns carefully as background for a subse
quent chapter, where their relevance to the politics of Buganda in a turbu
lent decade was made clear. “Most psychologists,” she argued, “would
claim that attitudes to authority are based on the patterns formed . . . in
early childhood.”36 Pretended flattery and obedience overlying a reality of
intense meritocratic competition in a highly mobile society of fearful and
potentially vulnerable authorities, she implied, was rooted in older political
forms and persisted as a standard cultural expectation, enforced with dev
astating violence.
Richards went further, though. She emphasized not simply that atti
tudes formed in childhood shaped ideas of authority, but that in Buganda’s
historical experience, the student activists at King’s College Budo in 1941
became fixed in a pattern of alliances that continued for decades. In other
words, the “adolescent politics” condemned by Bishop Stuart was rooted
in the experiences of actual adolescents. The region’s political turmoil, with
grievances over cotton prices, complaints about the pace of Africanization,
rejection of closer union with Kenya, and anger over the governor’s inter
vention in appointments to offices in both Buganda and the protectorate,
thus boiled down to a psychological issue.
Significantly implicit in Richards’s analysis was the conclusion that just
as Ganda parents did not make their children happy by giving them what
they asked for, but instead used force to keep order and build success, no
amount of dialogue, mediation, or negotiation by Britain was likely to pro
duce social peace. Indeed, Ganda society demanded struggle, competition,
and sometimes pretense, slander, and flattery to function and to allow new
leaders to emerge.
A subsequent essay by Leonard Doob, based on an explicitly psycho
logical survey of “leaders” and “followers,” made the social psychology of
this vision even more explicit, so much so that it overwhelmed the more
usual political issues or programs in explaining behavior. In his surveys, the
single most dramatic difference between leaders and followers was their
analysis of a psychologically provocative stick drawing. Leaders, when
35 Ibid., 271.
36 Richards, “Traditional Values and Current Political Behaviour,” in Fallers, King’s Men,
295.
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shown the drawing, noted routinely: “son . . . dislikes the father.” Follow
ers, he asserted, never offered such an interpretation.37
Working in the middle of political crisis, and reporting directly both to
British officials of the resident’s office of Buganda and to the governor of
Uganda, as well as providing background papers and ongoing interpreta
tion and context for the visiting constitutional expert Sir Keith Hancock,
the Makerere academics’ perspectives on political culture were critically
important. Specific individuals did seek to deploy economic or conventional
class-based analyses of Buganda, but were met with scathing prepublication
critiques by Audrey Richards.38 The result was a working model of Ugan
dan politics that marginalized economic issues. Earlier clashes, such as the
1945 general strike or 1949 agitation over cotton prices, had led to concrete
reforms after officials acknowledged (if only in internal documents) the jus
tice of activists’ complaints about inadequate wages and cotton prices in
the context of war inflation and a noncompetitive cotton system. Next door
in Kenya, Mau Mau activists explicitly voiced their opposition to racially
exclusive policies regarding land ownership, presenting clear, easily under
stood grievances. Both economic complaints and accusations of exploita
tion could at times render British officials defensive and vulnerable. African
activists occasionally referred to such issues. Yet such concerns were not
at the center of imperial political debate in the 1950s in Uganda; British
interpreters’ explanations of events and tensions maintained that political
mobilization was psychological, rooted in political immaturity, a personal
issue that needed to be resolved by closer British engagement in develop
mental politics and institutions.39
Uganda’s own propagandists did not necessarily accept these charac
terizations of themselves as adolescent and of their rebellion and struggles
as signs of immaturity. Working with British leftists, Ignatius Musazi and
his colleagues in the Cotton Growers’ Association, and then in the Uganda
National Congress, denounced specific exploitative and unfair policies,
focusing first on cotton prices and ginning policy, then extending their cri
tique into questions of ministries and ultimately, by the late 1950s, calls for
self-government. More scathingly, Bataka Union activists, notably Semakula Mulumba, provided litanies of specific abuses tied to British rule. Such
37Doob, “Leaders, Followers and Attitudes Toward Authority,” in Fallers, King’s Men
341-45.
38 Audrey Richards’s comments on work by H. West, in Richards Papers 6/17; on T. V.
Sathyamurthy in Richards 6/3 and Richards’s notes on manuscript by Christopher Wrigley, 1957, Richards Papers 6/2.
39 Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis.”

131

JO URNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ♦ JANUARY 2017

activists offered a genuinely Ganda vision of political ethics and citizenship,
with a distinctive vision of rights and responsibilities and even accessible,
participatory governance.40
Within a rhetoric of adolescence, though, British experts rejected such
complaints as superficial and irrelevant. Investigative commissioners con
cluded after the 1945 and 1949 uprisings that unrest happened in part
because Britain, distracted by the war, had failed to provide an ideal form
of close paternal guidance. British governors and church figures not only
saw Buganda’s king as an unruly youth, but also read his youth onto
Buganda’s people more generally, whether discussing his marriage plans
and difficulties, or attempting to understand Buganda’s political leadership
through their school records and relations with mission patrons.41 Some
experts went even further. The influential canon Herbert Grace, who had
headed King’s College Budo during the youth of key political activists
before moving to Achimota and eventually retiring to the UK, wrote chidingly to Buganda’s prime minister, Mikaeri Kawalya-Kaggwa, rejecting
Kawalya-Kaggwa’s analysis of the trouble as economic and asserting
instead that the issue was simply one of “educated, intelligent young men.”
He advised that “you can’t repress this movement—it will grow even more
as your soldiers return and the more who are educated the more this move
ment will grow. . . . This young Africa is an explosive force and though the
numbers may be small, it will have growing power and it all depends how
it is treated now whether it becomes a curse or a blessing.”42
Grace continued his letter to complain of “half educated young men,”
asserting they needed more, not less, intervention if they were to be guided
into the “right paths” that would allow them to build Uganda rather than
engage in politics, anti-imperial struggle, or calls for rights, justice, account
ability, or independence. This rhetoric worked not simply because it
allowed British actors to defend their own actions in Buganda, but also
because it corresponded to some degree to the realities of the Ugandan
experience. Junior men, lacking offices and the respect of seniority, did
organize within Uganda, within associations that ranged from the Motor
Drivers’ Association to the Bataka Union and the Cotton Growers’ Associa
tion. These activists protested against chiefs and British alike. Yet their
rebellion was not the simple opposition to the status quo implied by observ
ers’ denunciations of adolescence or immature ambition and ignorance. It
40 See Summers, “Grandfathers, Grandsons.”
41 H. M. Grace to Bishop Stuart, 1 August 1948 and H. M. Grace to A. Sempa, 14 March
1946 in File on the Disturbances, CBMS A/T. 3/2 Box 281, SOAS special collections.
42 H. M. Grace to M. Kawalya Kagwa, 17 January 1946, A/T. 3/2 Box 281, CBMS.
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was often a struggle for opportunities and offices rather than against
oppressors or exploiters. Rhetoric about youth and maturing adolescence
allowed such positive aspects of the struggle to take center stage. Especially
when explaining educated, elite youth and Baganda landowners, this lan
guage of adolescence interpreted protest as ambition, not opposition, and
avoided permanently dividing the country.
The portrayal of Baganda and Buganda as adolescent people in an ado
lescent nation did not block conflict, but it allowed analysts and interpreters
to present major upheaval as petty. In his influential work on Lesotho,
James Ferguson described a modern development ideology and program
awkwardly as an “anti-politics machine.”43 Within Uganda, though, it is
significant that this developmentalist anti-politics machine required a lan
guage not simply of expertise and international technical high modernism
and progress (ideas that have to date been emphasized in such discussions)
but also a metaphor of youth that helped contain and delegitimize struggle,
reshaping the very real politics and protests of the time. In doing so, it
allowed the stressed, post-World War II British Empire to deflect both local
and international attention from just how little cash, material, and input it
had to offer as resources for a high-modernist development policy. With
their emphasis on psychology and personal development, British academics
and planners also kept the focus of Uganda’s politics on identity—on who
the maturing adolescent really was—rather than on questions of power,
justice, or inequity, whether within Buganda or in Buganda’s relations with
Uganda and Britain.

UGANDANS’ CHALLENGES
At times, Ugandans challenged these characterizations. The Uganda
National Congress rejected a politics grounded in a youthful identity.
Instead, it pursued rights in an explicitly political framework easily recog
nizable to more conventional students of political development and democ
racy. UNC members wrote petitions; they sought electoral office; they held
mass meetings; they deployed the press; and, rejected from key offices, they
pursued parallel structures that had at least the general appearance of repre
sentative governance. And by the late 1950s, they had become the spear
head of Uganda’s demands for independence, putting forward a motion
43 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine.
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for Uganda’s self-government and independence to Uganda’s Legislative
Assembly.
Yet when engaging in imperial debates dominated by metaphors of
youth, prominent activists found metaphors of maturation inescapable;
rather than rejecting them entirely, they reinterpreted their implications.
Instead of seeing maturation as an apolitical, organic, biosocial phenome
non, they emphasized that it was learned. Senior politician Y. S. Bamutta
put forward the motion for self-government in April of 1957 using this
shaded language of childhood and youth. British officials had noted
increasing political activity in Uganda, mocking these initiatives by noting
that the “infant mortality [of parties was] high.” Bamutta argued that “for
a country to grow and improve and to run its affairs it must be given
responsibility. If it is given the responsibility it will learn.” He acknowl
edged that mistakes were likely, but that “we have been waiting for the last
60 years. You cannot train a child to walk and give it a stick to lean on.
That way it will never be able to walk. You must let it try and let it fall
down and then it will pick itself up and thus will learn how to walk.”
Apprenticeships, clerkships, and educational institutions must give way to
real authority and accountability. Learning, Bamutta believed, happened
when the youthful nation faced its own consequences, without protection
from an imperial sponsor that seemed far too reluctant to let go. Others
continued Bamutta’s argument, as his motion for independence was
seconded by D. L. K. Lubogo and expanded on by Dr. E. M. K. Muwazi,
who combined the available metaphors to assert:
I know we shall tumble and fall, like a toddler, but of course, that
is inevitable. I know we shall try and get up again after tumbling
and falling and it is no good anyone telling us to walk slowly.
Circumstances, sir, do not permit us to walk slowly any more . . .
when you want to learn how to swim you must get into the water.
You cannot learn to swim simply by staying outside the water and
if we are to learn how to govern ourselves we must get into govern
ment ourselves and learn the art of self-government.. ,44
Many Ugandan members of the Legislative Assembly struggled over
whether that growing mastery would come from an organic process of mat
uration, or an active process of learning. Z. C. K. Mungonya, who held
the portfolio of minister of land tenure, sounded distinctly British as he
44 Legislative Assembly Debates (April 1957) in CO 822/1510, National Archives.
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emphasized the need for maturity and asserted that “every thinking African
would agree that it is very unwise for the Government simply to establish
self-government and thrust so much responsibility upon the people who are
not ready or competent to carry it out.” G. B. K. Magezi spoke more poeti
cally, but even more fearfully, noting that trees that grew fast died quickly,
and worrying that too much influence from Buganda meant that quick inde
pendence would degenerate into Ugandans sending telegrams to London
asking for Britain to come and save them. Instead of rushing into selfgovernance, he concluded, “we have got to let it grow naturally and attain
it at the right time . . ,”45
It was, though, an academic associated with Makerere, Kenneth
Ingham, who patronizingly congratulated everyone in the Legislative
Assembly on their speeches before reclaiming the metaphors of youth that
the Congress party had tried to seize. He observed that “metaphors have
been employed of children learning to run and they cannot learn to run
without falling. With that . . . I agree. On the other hand, the difference
between a child falling and sustaining slight bodily damage is a difference
of a very great degree from a minister of the Government making a com
plete mess of his particular portfolio and ruining possibly the lives of a
million people in this country.” Ingham opposed the motion for selfgovernment.
While going down to defeat, Congress politicians (notably, Y. B.
Mugoma) voiced the fundamental inadequacy of such simple obstruction
ism, observing that the British had had 60 years to teach—and arguing
that without political pressure for self-governance, Britain’s failure to teach
might well continue, providing an excuse for continued domination and
exploitation.

CONCLUSION
Whether sincere or tactical, the metaphor offered by Ingham and others
in the administration, academic, and clerical worlds of Uganda who saw
Ugandans as restless, demanding adolescents not yet mature enough, or
educated enough, for self-governance, was a temporarily effective language.
Ultimately, though, it gave way to the realities of British weakness and
Ugandan politics. In the aftermath of independence, its echoes offered an
45 Ibid.
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“I told you so” during challenging years of political stalemate, abuses, and
collapse.
Turning the discussion of independence into a metaphorical examina
tion of childhood, adolescence, and parenting had sidestepped any number
of issues critical to Uganda’s future, ranging from class conflict to struggles
between regions and debates over “traditional” rulers and laws. The meta
phor of adolescence was convenient and flexible, facilitating peace and
polite discourse among elites. It pushed back disorderly, divisive clashes of
interests that could emerge in overt political contention and debate. It
failed, though, to offer ordinary Ugandans a way to act democratically in
pursuit of their aims.
Childhood and youth are powerful metaphors. They can persuade.
They can deflect. They can mobilize, or shape, empathic responses to crises.
Ideas of childhood and youth are rarely simply questions of biology or neu
trality. Instead, they have at times provided frames that policymakers and
activists use to understand and intervene in events. They work to privilege
visions of developmental growth and to delegitimate explicit discussions of
power and politics. Ideas of childhood and diminished responsibility inhibit
or evade accountability. The Congress politicians of the 1950s saw them
selves as adults. Emphasizing immaturity and making excuses for perform
ance diminished these activists’ accountability and, in metaphors of the
time used by Ugandan activists, blocked democracy in favor of fostering a
lingering protectorate of cripples. Instead of emphasizing politics or a need
to respond to popular mobilization and demands, this strategy offered pro
gressive British colonial development planners in the 1940s and 1950s an
overtly non-racial, non-Marxist opportunity—an apolitical means to justify
and enforce their imperial guidance.
University of Richmond.
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